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Abstract: A multiplicity of spatial plans in a planning system can have different ways of 
co-existing under different institutional organizations. Having a highly 
centralized government like China, the phenomenon of a multitude of 
national-level plans dominating at the same time has its own unique 
characteristics. Much literature emphasizes only the lacking of coordination 
between governmental institutes. However, this research finds that the current 
constitution of the Chinese planning system profoundly reflects the relations 
between central and local governments. This paper first examines the 
characteristics of the Chinese political system, briefly reviewing the iterative 
process of “centralization-decentralization-selective centralization”, showing 
the rise and fall of spatial planning as an administrative tool of local 
governments. Especially since the 1990s, the central government has raised 
revenue from the local level, which leads to local governments depending 
more on selling land for quick money. But as the urban expansion accelerates, 
the state asserts its control on local development by the National Main-
function Plan and National Land-use Plan, which seriously impedes the 
coordination of spatial plans at different levels. Therefore, this study argues 
that spatial planning reform in China requires not only generating integrated 
information platforms and technical standards, but more importantly, 
establishing new relations between central and local government. In the end, 
some suggestions are made on central authorities reducing the constraints of a 
planning censorship system and rebalancing the responsibility and the public 
finance of local government on planning matters.  
1. INTRODUCTION  
In China, planning is an administrative tool of the government. There are 
quite a number of and types of spatial plans. At least 83 types of plans are 
authorized by laws or regulations, of which 22 are spatial plans, and 25 are 
spatially-related planning tools utilized by various government departments 
(Liu, Shi, & Xiang, 2017) Among them, city master planning, land use 
planning and major function-oriented zones’ planning are the three most 
comprehensive spatial plans, which make an important component of the 
spatial planning system of China. 
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City master planning, managed by Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural 
Development, is to determine the city's future scale and direction of 
development, to set up goals, to reasonably deploy urban functions, and to 
clarify specific spatial layout. The history of city master planning is the 
longest in the country. A matured system of planning techniques has formed 
due to this (Li, 2011; Gu, 2015) Land use planning, organized by the 
Ministry of Land and Resources Management, is to formulate overall 
arrangement and layout in time and space for the function, scale and 
intensity of land development for a certain region. It is a tool of the central 
government to practice land supply regulation and to control the overall 
aggregation of land for construction purposes (Gu, 2015; J Lin, Zhou, & 
Zhang, 2017). Major function-oriented zones’ planning, supervised by the 
National Development and Reform Commission, is to divide the country or 
region into spatial and functional zones with specific development positions, 
based on comprehensive analysis of resources and environment carrying 
capacity, the existing development density and potential and other factors. 
The major function-oriented plan first appeared in 2007 with the purpose of 
forming a framework for coordinating regional development (Shi, 2008; 
Wang, 2009). 
Other than the three major spatial planning types, environmental plan 
and the national five-year plans (Wang & Shen, 2014) also have the 
tendency to develop into more comprehensive national overall plans with 
the purpose of effectively coordinating the contradiction between 
"development" and "protection" through scientifically arranging all spatial 
resources (Gu, 2015). However, these spatial plans are fragmented, lacking 
cohesion, and conflicting with each other, which has brought about the 
problem of increasing inefficiency and waste of resources, which has also 
weakened the legitimacy and executive efficiency of spatial planning. 
In recent years, these problems have become a hot topic in China's 
planning circles. Many scholars have discussed how to standardize the 
technical standards of various planning to integrate the multiple spatial plans 
(Xiao, 1998; Lu, Yang, & Li, 2004; Cai, 2009; Huang, et al, , 2016). These 
studies avoid the institutional background of the coexisting phenomenon. 
Some other scholars emphasize solving the problem from the relations 
between government departments, by establishing a collaboration platform 
(Harbers et al., 2017; Yejun Huang, 2012; Y. Wang, 2009; Zhu & Yin, 
2016). A multitude of spatial plans of similar spatial scales coexisting has 
been and is now still the case in some countries with long-standing planning 
traditions, such as the Netherlands (Faludi & Van der Valk, 1994; Zhou, Hu, 
& Gu, 2017). It is easy to simply accuse the lack of horizontal coordination 
between government departments as the reason for the overlap, crossing-
over of and conflicts of spatial plans, regardless what socio-economic 
system the planning system is embedded in. 
There are few articles that try to explore the reasons for the coexistence 
of the multiple spatial plans and the significant meaning of planning 
integration from the angle of intergovernmental relations, especially the 
relation between the central and local governments. The relationship 
between the central government and local governments is an important issue 
in the construction of a major power system, which has a profound impact 
on the coordination of spatial development as well as on the planning 
system. Before China's decentralization reform in 1978, spatial planning was 
not widely seen in China, and urban planning was in a state of stagnation for 
a long time. But since the local government received more discretion from 
the central government, especially in the most recent 20 years, the types of 
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spatial plans organized by the central government department increased 
dramatically. For this reason, this article tries to understand the correlations 
between the phenomenon of the multiple-plan coexistence and the 
decentralization of state power. 
In China, the planning system is grounded in an all-around government 
management system. Under the "strong government and weak society" 
mechanism (A. D. Z. Wang, 2005), direct government control on spatial 
development has a more profound influence than that of countries with a 
market economy. Among the over 80 types of spatial plans, many, especially 
plans for relatively large scales, are in fact a tool of the central government 
making use of the administrative power of formulating and implementing 
spatial plans to guide and contain lower-level governments (Oi, 1992). 
This article first attempts to summarize the characteristics of the central 
and local relations in China, including the evolution of these relations and 
its impact on spatial development. Then, the nature and development of city 
master planning, land use planning, and major function-oriented zones’ 
planning will be analyzed, to reveal the need of the central government to 
control and regulate local development in different socio-economic 
development phases. This study argues that the phenomenon of coexistence 
of multiple spatial plans stems from the conflicts of interest of the lateral 
government departments only from the surface. But in fact, the conflict 
deeply reflects the vertical relations of different government levels, 
especially the logic between the central and local, during the gradual socio-
economic reform process. It is based on this theory, that the direction of 
“integration-of-multiple-spatial-plans” is discussed.  
2. RESEARCH APPROACH  
Much research has emphasized the low efficiency of the current planning 
system in China and thus has been eager to give suggestions on technical 
integration of different urban plans. But this article focuses on the 
fundamental reasons for the co-existence of multiple urban plans. It tries to 
reveal the reason why the central government put forward Land Use 
Planning and Major Function-oriented Zones’ Planning when the City 
Master Plan had been already in use before them. This study argues that the 
main reason lies in the desire for control from the central government to 
local government that causes the co-existence phenomenon.  
In that regard, this article focuses on the perspective of central and local 
relations since it is important to understand that the spatial planning system 
of China is deeply rooted in the country’s political system, under the 
background of “Strong Government and Weak Society” in China. Rooted in 
the planned economy system of past times, the central and local government 
relation is the most important feature of the nation’s institutional structure, 
so it is the main field of political system reform. This relation profoundly 
influences the spatial development and the spatial planning system of China.  
In the following sections, firstly a literature review is carried out to show 
the discussions on the central and local relations. The focus is on the land 
development driven by the local government following fiscal reform, and 
the consequences and pressure that the central government faces. Then, a 
systemic analysis is made for the main types of spatial planning in China 
that is the city master planning, land use planning, and the major function-
oriented zones’ planning. The orientation and main contents of the three 
plans are explained to reveal the purpose as to why the central government 
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is eager to introduce multiple types of comprehensive spatial plans. In 
conclusion, this study argues that the purpose of the planning system reform 
happening at the moment should again be to reflect the interests and 
demands of the central government, as it continues to assert control on local 
governments. 
3. TRANSITION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN 
CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
3.1 The relations of central and local during the 
planned-economic period 
In 1949, China began to establish a strict centralized planned-economic 
system. The fiscal, economic, financial and administrative power of the 
whole country was centralized in the hands of the central government. In 
this period, local governments worked only as agencies for the central 
government at lower levels. The institutional setup was organized in such a 
way to correspond to that of the central departments for social and economic 
management. In other words, the supervision and management systems were 
formed from top to bottom by departments and sectors, namely in "straps" - 
the vertical management system. Correspondingly, “blocks” - the horizontal 
structure - indicates management organization subordinated to the level of 
province, city, and county and so on. These kinds of “straps” and “blocks” 
formed the structure of a subordinated government system where 
responsibilities could be distributed in vertical manner from top to bottom, 
but also leading to the formation of complex central and local relations (Z. 
Zhou, 2009).  
In this strict central planning system, the central government was 
responsible for collecting and spending the budget. The budget for 
construction was for a long time formulated by the former National Planning 
Commission (current National Development and Reform Commission), and 
then distributed to and executed by the provinces. The corresponding funds 
were issued by the Ministry of Finance. Other than that, local governments 
had very few financial resources. Local enterprises were mostly state-owned 
enterprises, whose profits were ought to be collected by the central 
government. Therefore, local governments were not motivated to develop 
their own economy and could only play the role of implementers of the 
central government's plan. Urban planning matters that were supposed to be 
within the scope of local government responsibilities, such as the scale and 
pace of urbanization and the provision of public service, were also to obey 
the overall order of the central economic plan, controlled by the centrally-
planned instructions. 
This centralized system was able to promote massive social production, 
avoiding the waste of resources caused by local competition, and ensuring 
an equalized allocation of social resources. However, the highly-centralized 
system led to a lack of an incentive mechanism. Thus, under the strict 
central planning system, sometimes small-scale decentralization was 
empowered to local governments. For example, the responsibility and 
financial resources to provide public services. It was hoped that local 
governments would shoulder more burdens of local development, making up 
for the differences between the “one-size-fits-all” policy of the central 
government and the actual needs of local areas, increasing their economic 
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vitality. However, while local governments actively involved themselves in 
pursuing local economic growth, it brought about the problem of stability 
for the macro-economy, which again made the central government 
compelled to increase discretion granted to local governments. Between 
1949 and 1977, China's institutional model saw the iteration of 
“decentralization and centralization” (Z. Zhou, 2009).  
3.2 Central and local relations in transition 
From 1978, China begun with its economic reform process, the central 
government started to decentralize more power and financial resources to 
local governments. The financial contracting system was adjusted to 
ordinate with the new central and local relations. In 1980, the fiscal revenue-
sharing system was carried out, which formed a financial relation based on 
the division of income and expenditure and self-balancing. In 1994, the 
central and local tax distribution system was adjusted. Local economic 
growth was further linked to local revenue. At the same time, administrative 
power was also decentralized. For example, local governments can 
formulate local development policies and spatial plans according to the 
actual situation of local regions, most of which did not require approval by 
the state. Under the gradual decentralization process, local governments 
have become a stakeholder with their own range of powers and 
responsibilities, and relatively independent financial discretion. They are no 
longer executive agencies of the central government under the traditional 
planned economic system, following hierarchical order. L. Zhou (2008) 
argues that the vertical hierarchy governmental system is a level-to-level 
agency system, where the upper-level government decentralizes the 
management powers (security, employment, economic development, to 
provide public goods, etc.) as a package delivery to the next lower level 
government. But the appointment of lower-level government officials, 
evaluation and management are entrusted to their direct superior 
departments. 
In addition, the central government meant to stimulate the local 
governments to become the main bodies responsible for developing local 
economies, by offering more supportive policy and opportunities for those 
local regions that had better-developing momentum. At the same time, an 
evaluation index system was established for the selection and appointment 
system of government officials. Although indexes are diverse, city GDP 
(gross domestic product) growth and the scale of local economies are always 
the most important evaluation indexes, as the key reference for promotion.  
Although the direction of China's reform was to establish a market-
oriented system, the government's direct intervention of microeconomics 
was to gradually decrease, with the leading role of the government in 
guiding and controlling economic development resulting in no fundamental 
change. Only through the decentralization of powers, the dominator of local 
development has shifted from the central government to local governments. 
The divisions of central government departments at local levels, in the 
vertical “straps”, work as main bodies driving local economic growth 
(Caulfield, 2006). Tending to get actively involved in their economy, local 
governments usually make use of the state-owned land resources to attract 
private investment, promoting economic growth and city construction. But it 
has also brought about macroeconomic problems, such as overheating 
investment, low investment efficiency, and similarity of industrial structure. 
The excessive speed and scale of land development is especially troubling. 
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4. LOCAL GOVERNMENT-LED LAND 
DEVELOPMENT 
Due to the ambiguity of land property rights, the land has become an 
essential resource that local governments can easily grasp (Jieming Zhu, 
2002). After the reform of the tax sharing system in 1994, local governments 
began to use the monopoly of local-level development to transfer a large 
amount of agricultural land into commercial development, forming an 
upsurge of enclosures. Initially, local governments were keener to engage in 
the construction of development zones, implemented the strategy of 
“building nests and attracting phoenixes”, and attracted investment through 
infrastructure construction and cheap land rents, thereby expanding the local 
government tax source. With the large-scale promotion by governments at 
all levels, development zones were hot across the country. In the past decade 
or so, with the gradual saturation of the manufacturing industry, warming of 
real estate, and the enthusiasm of the municipal government for land 
finance, the municipal government has acquired huge revenue from land 
sales by accumulating large amounts of construction funds. The revenue 
from land sales accounts for more than 50% of the individual urban fiscal 
revenue. 
These government-led developments have brought about some serious 
problems: (1) Widening income differences and social differentiation: Most 
local governments did not respect the wishes of farmers and forcibly 
requisitioned rural collective land. Economic compensation was not in 
place; the auction price of land in some mega cities continued to rise, and 
real estate prices also rose, which increased the living cost and business 
costs for new urban residents; most of the land revenue was concentrated. In 
cities, the gap between urban and rural disparities had been widened. (2) 
The green land and cultivated land were greatly reduced, causing an 
ecological crisis. (3) There is a structural disorder in land use: There are 
many high-tech parks, creative industry parks, new urban districts, big 
squares and wide roads, many of which are idle lands and “ghost towns”. (4) 
In recent years, the real estate market in many places has become saturated, 
and borrowing has become a new and compelling choice for local 
governments: Since the late 1990s, local governments have begun to 
establish local financing platforms to solve the shortfall in expenditure. In 
particular, after the financial crisis of 2008, the Central Government 
launched a fiscal investment of 4 trillion RMB, and local governments 
launched a corresponding supporting plan of nearly 10 trillion RMB. The 
scale of local investment and financing platforms and local government debt 
began to expand rapidly. In recent years, great threats to macroeconomic 
stability have been formed. 
The over-supply of land caused by land development has triggered 
territorial politics to emerge (Rithmire, 2013) and controversy over 
excessive “incentive mechanisms” of the central government to localities 
and the lack of “restraint mechanisms”, which has also made spatial 
planning a focus (L. Wang & Shen, 2014). 
 
4.1 Coexistence of spatial plans: a reflection of the 
failure of traditional planning? 
In general, local governments need to have discretion in providing local 
public services and promoting local economies. In the process of 
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decentralization and economic transition, the expansion of the discretionary 
power of Chinese local governments, while contributing to economic 
growth, has also led to a series of problems such as the overlarge scale of 
spatial development. For this reason, the central government will raise 
doubts about whether “the discretion of the local government is excessive”. 
Therefore, the central government will inevitably need to strengthen the 
restrictions on local governments and control the discretion of the local 
governments in the development of urban land and space resources. Due to 
the lack of legal, judicial, and fiscal constraints, and the failure to establish a 
set of power supervision mechanisms to adapt to the market economy, 
higher levels of government often rely on administrative measures to 
achieve supervision of local governments. In administrative measures, the 
role of administrative directives in the traditional planned economy has 
weakened, and spatial planning and performance evaluation indicators have 
replaced traditional administrative directives to a certain extent. Among 
them, to ensure that spatial planning effectively constrains the spatial 
development behavior of local governments, the central government will 
strengthen the restrictive content of spatial planning. 
Before the decentralization reform, there were only a few types of 
planning such as city master plan in the spatial planning system, and the 
urban plans belonged to the scope of the municipal government's authority. 
The restrictive role of the urban planning was only for the society and the 
lower levels of government, and it lacked constraints on the municipal 
government itself. For this reason, a new type of spatial planning with the 
main purpose of constraining local government emerged to make up for the 
inadequacy of the central government's local control measures. 
4.2 City Master Planning: administrative tools of 
municipal government 
In all kinds of spatial planning in China, the history of city master 
planning is the oldest. Contemporary city master planning in China emerged 
in the 1950s. At that time, in order to coordinate with the construction of 
key national projects and coordinate the relations between key projects and 
the development of urban space, the “city master plan” system was initially 
established, and planning was carried out in several key industrial cities. 
The “master plan” at this stage is seen as a continuation of the economic and 
social development plan, with a focus on urban functional zoning, site 
selection of industrial projects, and infrastructure construction, and direct 
development of material space. During the Great Leap Forward in 1958, 
local governments were allowed to coordinate the resources of their 
jurisdiction and develop the local economy, which led to a nationwide 
investment boom. New industrial lands appeared in cities. Urban planning 
was also active at that time. In order to adapt to the Great Leap Forward in 
industrial construction, some cities proposed unrealistic planning goals. For 
instance, the urban planning of Yinchuan and Xiangfan put forward the 
development targets of 1 million and 1.2 million people respectively based 
on the original population of 100,000. However, in the subsequent 
rectification of the economic order, the discretion of the local government 
was constrained, and the city planning as an administrative tool for the 
municipal government was required to be suspended for three years, but it 
was actually a long-term stagnation (K. Wang, 1999). 
The urban planning system was restored in 1978, transformed from 
serving plans and projects of upper levels to serving the local government 
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for comprehensively allocating spatial resources (Ng & Tang, 2004). By 
1990, a legal planning system centered on the "Urban Planning Law" was 
essentially formed. Urban planning belonged to the scope of a local 
government's authority. Through urban planning, it would conduct "building 
arrangements" for space, and then integrate the resources within its 
jurisdiction, and meanwhile coordinate the appeals of various departments. 
It was based on the physical form of urban space, guided by the goals of 
economic and social development for a certain period of time, and through 
the determination of the nature, scale and development direction of the city, 
spatial arrangements were made for the road systems and other 
infrastructure, buildings, industries and other urban functional units 
involved in the urban physical development pattern, in order to coordinate 
arrangements for the spatial layout of various functions of the city, realize 
the rational use of urban land, and promote the development of urban space 
in an orderly manner. 
From the perspective of planning technology, urban planning has weak 
constraints. The technical standards for urban planning are provided by the 
Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development to provide technical 
standards. According to the "Urban and Rural Planning Law", the "local 
government shall, before compiling the city master plan, make a summary of 
the implementation of the current general city plan and the implementation 
of various special plans, and evaluate the supporting capabilities and 
construction conditions of the infrastructure." "Based on regional planning 
and urban-rural integration, forward-looking studies on strategic issues such 
as the city's orientation, development goals, urban functions, and spatial 
distribution should be conducted.” But these legal provisions lack rigidly 
binding content. For example, the scale of future urban development in the 
planning period, despite the existence of per capita land use standards and 
other restrictions, due to the lack of strict validation of the "population size 
forecast", urban planning is often based on deliberately increasing the size 
of the population forecast, and then making the scale of urban construction 
exceed actual needs. Some urban planning even often reverses the predicted 
size of urban population through the scale of construction land needed by 
local governments to achieve the legitimacy of the planned scale of urban 
construction land in the future. 
In addition, for a long time, there has lacked upper-level macro planning 
in the urban planning system to guide the overall urban planning. Although 
the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development and the Provincial 
Office of Housing and Urban-Rural Development have compiled national 
and provincial urban system plans, most of them are guidelines and have 
few restrictions. Moreover, the preparation time and specific requirements 
for these macro-scale plans all have differences between each other, lack 
coordination and convergence between the top and bottom, and the authority 
and operability are also limited (X. Li & Men, 2004) 
Although urban planning needs to be approved by local people’s 
congresses, local people’s congresses as the highest authorities are not 
always able to perform their due functions and roles. Although the power of 
local government officials is fundamentally given by the Municipal People's 
Congress, it is more directed by the higher authorities. The position of the 
local people’s congressman is mostly taken over by local officials, so the 
role of local people’s congresses is largely blurred. In the process of urban 
decision-making, the procedural rules for the Municipal People's Congress 
to participate in decision-making are not specific and are unclear, making 
the role of the Municipal People's Congress greatly limited. 
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Although the "Urban and Rural Planning Law" has established a 
"hierarchical examination and approval" method, it also stipulates that the 
“city master plans” of some important cities need to be reported to the 
central government for approval. However, the main approval content lacks 
major and minor differences. Moreover, excessive approval content and 
department involvement have exceeded the authority of the higher-level 
government. These have also resulted in that the duration and efficiency of 
the approval cannot be guaranteed. Some approval procedures are frequently 
3-5 years, sometimes eight years. Although it was not always possible to 
obtain approval promptly, the planning prior to the approval process was 
still implemented to ensure the timeliness of the plan. Therefore, the low 
efficiency in the approval process not only reduces the guiding role of the 
examination and approval, but also reduces the binding significance of the 
approval, which provides an excuse for planning violations and illegal 
activities (Zhao & Hao, 2012). 
City master planning has gradually progressed toward standardization 
and legalization. Till 1990 a legal planning system based on the Urban 
Planning Law had been only basically formed. A judicial accountability 
system in urban planning was also missing. A city master plan as a 
normative legal document, although directly affecting the allocation of 
public resources and regulating the public interest, in its preparation and 
results, is regarded as an abstract administrative act and does not fall within 
the scope of administrative litigation regulated by the Administrative 
Litigation Law of China. It is considered with non-litigating nature. For the 
concrete administrative behaviors of the implementation of urban planning, 
the scope of procedures and jurisdictions that the government should follow 
is more of a principled provision. In practice, administrative regulations or 
orders are often used in place of legal restrictions, thereby reducing judicial 
accountability. As the vulnerable group of urban planning games, the public 
cannot safeguard their rights and interests through more deterrent judicial 
relief. Regardless of the old version of the "Urban Planning Law" or the 
existing "Urban and Rural Planning Law", the specific applicability of 
relevant laws and regulations depends on the local government's adaptation 
to local conditions. This is a practice that has been delegated authority but is 
not clearly regulated, which causes the legislators to inadvertently give the 
local government too much discretion, and the judicial system that abuses 
the discretion of the municipal government has not yet been established. 
Due to the lack of restraint mechanisms for upper-level governments and 
the lack of inherent social restraint mechanisms, urban planning has become 
an administrative tool or growth tool for local governments, constantly 
expanding the scale of cities and pursuing “leap-forward development” (Wu, 
2015). Sometimes urban planning even serves the major personal 
achievements of the municipal government’s leaders. With the beginning of 
the new leadership term cycle, the government frequently compiles or 
revises the “master plan” in order to meet the new leadership’s need to 
pursue short-term performance. In this case, "urban planning" starts by 
reflecting the intention of the administrative officials. What is more, local 
governments often use the image of city planning “technical rationality” to 
persuade the superiors to circumvent the limitations of other types of spatial 
planning (such as the subsequent land use planning).  
In short, since urban planning authority belongs to the municipal 
government, and the planning approval, implementation, supervision 
systems and the technical content of planning are all lacking in effective 
constraints, urban planning shows “expanding” characteristics. This has also 
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led to the difficulty of urban planning in implementing the central 
government's regulatory requirements for the municipal government in 
urban development.  
4.3 Land Use Planning: restrictive on the total amount of 
land for development 
China's land-use planning began in the 1950s, focusing on the planning 
of state-owned farms, people's communes and irrigated areas, with the aim 
of serving agriculture. The National Land Administration was also affiliated 
with the Ministry of Agriculture at that time. The planning experts were 
mainly soil experts. In the 1980s, land use planning at the county level 
began to appear. The first “Land Administration Law of the People's 
Republic of China” was issued in 1986, being clearly required for general 
land use planning. It regulated that “urban planning and general land use 
planning should be coordinated; in a planned urban area, land use shall 
conform with city planning". The first round of general land use plans 
focused mainly on rural agricultural areas outside urbanized areas. They 
emphasized research on the bearing capacity of land, the development and 
governance of cultivated land, the prediction of urban land, index 
adjustment and partitioning. They become the main content of general land 
use planning. The suitability of certain types of land for certain functions, 
the allocation of resources among different industries, sectors, and regions 
and the spatial organization of land use functions have been paid much 
attention to (J Lin et al., 2017) . However, the social status and juridical 
power of the general land use planning under the market economy had not 
reached the height it should have. The planning was lacking an effective 
regulative mechanism on urban constructed land, constraint methods on the 
transition of farmland to non-agricultural functions, protection regulations 
on cultivated land, as well as control on the development of township 
enterprises. 
Since the 1990s, there has been a boom in “land enclosure” activity, 
especially in 1992 and 1993, when the "real estate boom" and "special 
economic zone" wave swept through China. The speed that the agriculture 
land was diminishing at reached a record high. The phenomenon let the 
central government recognize the importance of implementing restriction on 
spatial development. In 1997, the No. 11 files issued by the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China, "Notice on Further 
Strengthening Land Management and Protecting Arable Land”, emphasized 
that “according to China's specific conditions, the land management in our 
country, especially the measures for protecting cultivated land, must be very 
strict, and must be implemented stringently”. It required strictly that the total 
amount of cultivated land of provincial governments could only be 
increased, must not be reduced, and be based on a dynamic balance manner, 
and additionally, that efforts were to be made to improve the quality of 
cultivated land. The policy also called for careful preparation, revision and 
implementation of general land use planning. This was during the reform of 
decentralization, a power control tool by the central government to manage 
the development scale of local levels, when other directive control methods 
over the local governments were decreasing (Gu, 2015; J Lin et al., 2017). 
To this end, the status and usefulness of the general land use planning 
had been significantly promoted. Land use planning was endowed with the 
function of restricting the total amount of land for development. The core 
meaning of the land use planning had shifted to improving the land use 
178 IRSPSDA International, Vol.6 No.3 (2018), 168-184  
 
efficiency, and to the compensation principle of linking the decrease of 
cultivated land for development with reclamation for new arable land 
elsewhere. General land use planning was purposed to secure national land 
for national economic and social development by applying overall 
management and planned allocation of various types of land functions for 
development based on the coordination of various governmental 
departments with land demand. The plan made every effort to make full and 
reasonable use of limited land resources, according to the determined land 
use type. On the planning content, away from the single agricultural land 
planning in the past, its planning scope was expanded to all urban and rural 
land within the territory of the overall arrangement. It shifted from focusing 
on only utilizing land for development into a comprehensive theme for land 
development, protection and renovation; from focusing on the micro-scale 
land-use organization, to more macro-control and policy guidance; from 
emphasizing on production and development, to promoting the coordinated 
economic, social, resource and environmental development by master 
planning. 
The legal status of the general land use plan had also been greatly 
improved. Once approved, the plan would become legally binding and 
incorporated into the five-year plan and annual plan of the national 
economic and social development and shall be strictly implemented. By the 
end of 2000, land use planning at five levels, from the national to the town 
level, had basically been completed around the country and implementation 
started, following a step by step top-down control through the five 
hierarchies. To this point, the system has been established for the general 
land use planning, based on the central control of land supply constraints. 
The second round of the general land use plan, that of 1997, emphasized 
too much on agricultural land, especially the protection of cultivated land 
and permanent farmland, with the aim to "strictly restrict the conversion of 
agricultural land into construction land, controlling the total amount of 
construction land", "to ensure no decrease on the total amount of cultivated 
land". As a result, construction land necessary for national economy 
development was not planned for well enough, and the impact and demand 
on the ecological environment did not have sufficient research support. The 
plan had been violated again and again in actual operation, for it was against 
the logic of economic and social development. Thus, it did not really show 
positive effects of land use planning. The third round of the land use plan 
was formulated in 2006, which set up the rationale of being "global, flexible 
and dynamic". A land use evaluation index system was created for the 
economical and intensive use of land, from the economic, ecological and 
social points of view. Space-time and potential analyses would be performed 
for the land use of specific areas, providing a base for the control index 
decomposition in the land use functional plan and spatial layout of 
construction land (J Lin et al., 2017). 
Henceforth, general land use planning is on the path to becoming a 
regional comprehensive planning strategy because of its core role of 
implementing control of land use and development for the central 
government. In contrast to the city planning, land use planning emphasizes 
restriction in quantity of land development from the national strategic point 
of view to that of local governments. The "land rules" and "land indicators" 
formulated in the land use plans must be strictly complied with by city 
plans. The city planning departments are often in a relatively weak position 
when coordination is needed between it and the land-use planning 
department. The comprehensive long-term development goals and visions of 
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city plans are subject to the fixed amount of land available as established in 
the land use plan. Interestingly, city plans have become a tool of local 
government to bargain for more land for development from provincial and 
higher levels.  
The emergence of land use planning has profoundly affected the 
relations between central and local governments in China. Due to the 
commonly-seen discrepancies between local demand of land for social and 
economic development and the amount of land predicted and restricted in 
the land use planning, the plan has become a straightjacket  of local growth, 
just like in a period of a planned economic system with a tight control of 
supply of resources (Gu, 2015). The principle of dynamic balance of the 
increase of construction land in the urban area and compensated with the 
reclamation of new arable land elsewhere has become the basis of local 
governments lobbying for more policy support. 
4.4 Major Function-oriented Zones’ Planning: 
hierarchical top-down plan 
 The central government tends to pursue the macroscopic benefits, 
advocating differentiated growth, opposing the one-hive growth model. 
However, due to the emphasis on the effectiveness of policy and the lack of 
effective mechanisms in coordinating local interests, the central 
government's control policy often works as a "one size fits all". This kind of 
policy is often made by a certain central ministry or committee from its own 
perspective and is oriented towards a single goal. For example, the second 
edition of the national general land use plan ignored the comprehensive goal 
of social development, neglected the influence of efficiency and social 
justice, and resulted in high social costs. Therefore, it is difficult to ensure 
monitoring and management of spatial plans, if only relying on the policy 
and plans made by the central government. 
In order to frame reasonable targets that fits local situations, the eleventh 
five-year plan in 2006 put forward a new type of spatial plan - Major 
Function-oriented Zones’ Planning, intending to clarify the prioritized 
functions suitable for a certain region in the country, re-arranging the pattern 
of regional development before the relations of various types of spatial 
planning is settled. It had the ambition to become the foundation of 
decision-making for various types of spatial planning, and therefore forming 
a coordinated system through four governmental levels (national-provincial-
municipal-county) and between different government sectors (Shi, 2008). 
The document "Opinions on the Preparation of Major Function-oriented 
Zones’ Plan" (‘the Plan’) by the State Council of 2007 put forward that, the 
Plan is strategic, fundamental, and legally binding in nature, and is the 
overall basis for national economic and social development and a variety of 
spatial planning in spatial development and arrangement. Traditional 
development plans in China can be seen as being based on the plans and 
interests of a vertical “straps” system (central department’s) plan. It mainly 
gave priority to the balance of man-power, financial power and material 
resources, and determined the allocation proportion between departments 
and regions. But major function-oriented zones’ planning is based on the 
logic of regional comprehensively matched development and transverse 
comparability, emphasizing balanced and coordinated development among 
regions in the country in the long-term. 
The main intention of promoting this new type of spatial plan is to 
clarify the development direction, intensity control, to standardize the order 
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of development, to improve the development policy, and to form a 
sustainable national spatial development pattern. Resources and 
environment carrying capacity, and existing building density and 
development potential are objective differences between regions and are 
also the foundations in determining the main and prioritized functions for 
that specific region. By further referencing to factors like population 
distribution, economic layout, land use functions and the urbanization 
development pattern, reasonable arrangements can be made with 
comprehensive considerations for the overall development tasks for 
different regions in the national development framework. Optimized 
development zones, key development zones, restricted development zones 
and prohibited development zones are the four types of land regions used by 
the Plan. The main drive is to constrain irrational development impulses, 
using development intensity as a single coordinate to determine the type a 
region belongs to. The central government hopes to use this plan as a base to 
achieve regional harmonious development, promoting orderly and planned 
urbanization, and overall coordination of the spatial development pattern 
(Gu, 2015; Shi, 2008). 
Major function-oriented zones’ planning requires the higher-level 
government to base local land use and development plans on obeying the 
farmland protection line, the principle of ecological construction and 
environmental protection, and economic and social development demands. 
According to the types of main functional zone assigned to the region, local 
governments are given access to different land development rights or 
construction permissions (Jian Lin & Xu, 2014), and are accompanied with 
different evaluation criteria for local officials. Compared with the general 
land use plan, the National Major Function-oriented Zones’ Plan is 
performing the central planning of national economic and spatial 
development from the perspective of the central government. It is more 
comprehensive, macroscopic and strategic. 
5. DIRECTION OF INTEGRATING SPATIAL PLANS 
To promote the integration of multiple spatial plans is the reform 
direction of the Chinese government in recent years, with the aims to reduce 
repetitive planning and improve planning efficiency, to improve the 
rationality and comprehensiveness of planning through department 
cooperation; to promote the planning and management of docking through 
coordinated control, to improve the national macro-control system based on 
planning, to strengthen the seriousness and authority of planning, and 
implement the rules and regulations (D. Li, 2011). 
Therefore, for improving the spatial planning system and government 
efficiency, the spatial plans in the vertical system could already have basic 
cohesion regarding planning objectives, statistics caliber, spatial control 
method and planning sequence, etc. But for the overlapping and conflict in 
the horizontal system, it is necessary to calibrate and coordinate three key 
factors in spatial planning (i.e. targets, indicators and coordinates), content 
and scope of planning, standard statistical caliber, land use types, planning 
period, and restrictive index. Much workload is on re-standardization and 
building information platforms. However, it is not the "oneness" of planning 
technology that is the key issue here. The concept of "technology 
supremacy" needs to be reconsidered. More importantly, the "oneness" 
system mechanism should be established for achieving real integration. 
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To effectively control urban expansion, it is necessary to rationalize the 
relations among all kinds of spatial planning and re-build a planning system. 
City planning which is organized by local governments should pay attention 
to national policy guidance and constraints, especially those binding targets 
such as "newly-increased construction land", combining local "expansion-
oriented” planning with the “control-oriented" planning logic of the central 
government. On the other hand, the General Land Use Plan should be able 
to respect the actual local needs when allocating the land index. Increasing 
elasticity in the supply system can also help to avoid land provision 
deviation from the real need. Major function-oriented zones’ planning is 
above all other types of spatial planning. It is a kind of strategic policy 
planning that can provide a fundamental basis for city planning, general land 
use planning and environmental planning, transportation planning and other 
kinds of spatial planning. It is a long-term, strategic and fundamental 
framework plan, useful to establish cooperation among all kinds of spatial 
planning rather than replacing any of them. After formulating the main 
functions for strategic zones in the country, it is then possible to implement 
spatial management through city master plans and land use plans. Therefore, 
the new spatial planning system should base itself on major function-
oriented zones’ planning, and then include land use planning and city 
planning. 
Due to the decentralization reform, the restrictive mechanism of local 
governments had been weakened. New types of spatial planning were 
therefore strengthened to assert control from central to local governments. 
Therefore, it is possible to reduce dependence on restrictive planning, by 
reasonably increasing the level of central control of other aspects. Existing 
decentralization reform has remained focused on administrative and fiscal 
decentralization. A clearer functional division of different governmental 
levels should be established. That is to differ from the past reform, which 
attached great importance to the power division but not the function 
division. This study suggests further decentralizing much public 
management and public service powers to the local government, to 
strengthen the autonomy of local government management responsibility, 
and to make them bear more of the cost of management and service 
provision. And some functions such as economic adjustment shall be borne 
by city governments, or at a higher level, so that county governments and 
lower-level authorities can focus on providing better quality public services, 
as their main responsibility. Further, it is necessary to adjust the 
performance evaluation systems of local government officials, from a 
formerly pure economic index to a more comprehensive appraisal index. For 
example, taking social satisfaction as the main indicator in evaluating and 
appointing local government leaders. 
In addition, although all kinds of spatial planning emphasize the function 
of public policy, they reflect only the government's "responsibility". 
Because of the different functions and rights, cohesion problems arose due 
to different interests and starting points of different levels of governments. If 
planning is based on real public interest, it can avoid disputes brought about 
by different responsibilities. For this reason, the integration of multiple 
plans needs to review the formulation and implementation path of various 
spatial planning from the perspective of interest coordination in future 
periods, involving the perspectives of different stakeholders in the planning, 
introducing societal supervision mechanisms to the government, and 
expanding citizens' participation in depth and breadth to the processes of 
public management activity. Finally, local development plans should be 
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placed under the multiple supervisions of higher-level government, the 
people's congress of the same level, and of the people themselves.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The decentralization reform provides local governments more and more 
autonomy and resources of their own, making local governments the main 
bodies developing their local economies. They indeed are playing a crucial 
role in enhancing the local competitiveness and promoting economic 
growth. In recent years, urban expansion has been the most important 
strategy by local governments to accelerate capital accumulation. The rapid 
expansion has brought the problem of inefficient land use, which calls for 
the needs of macroeconomic regulation and control. The planning game in 
this sense is about land development rights. 
City master planning as a traditional type of spatial planning leads to 
weak control and regulation and has become a tool of expansion by local 
governments. To control the disordered urban growth, the central 
government must use alternative spatial planning tools to restrain local city 
plans. For example, raising the legal status and functional scope of national 
land use plans to control the expansion of urban construction at the local 
level by setting up rigid limits for total yearly amount of land differing in 
scale level for different regions. In addition, the major function-oriented 
zones’ plan gives instructions for the development direction, development 
intensity, order and development policy guides for regions, based on 
comparison of macro-regional development conditions, to form a sustainable 
national spatial development framework, and further guide and constrain 
city master plans and land use plans. The emergence of highly regulative 
types of spatial plans has also deeply affected the relations between the 
central and local governments. A new bargaining over land development 
rights between the central and local has therefore been triggered. The key 
issue of local governments is to persuade the central government to grant 
more amounts of land for development. 
Currently, both the central and local governments welcome plan 
integration reform with their own considerations. The central government 
considers that “integration” will bring more control and a tighter grip over 
bringing all the spatial factors together under one single organization, while 
resolving conflicts between different spatial plans shall bring local 
governments clarity about how much more land is to become available for 
construction. For both sides, the obscurity has severely hindered 
development. 
The key to “the-integration-of-multiple-spatial-plans” is not the 
coordination of planning techniques of different plans, but to establish a 
system that can coordinate the relations between the central and local 
governments. It must be able to reflect the state policy for spatial 
development, but also be specific and pertinent to local demands. All new 
spatial plans should be guided by the Main Functional Zoning Plan, and be 
based on the city plan, and integrate the restrictive content of a National 
Land Use Plan. 
In addition, the adjustment of the central and local relations can also 
bring opportunities for the “integration-of-multiple-plans”. The division of 
functions between governments at different levels and the strengthening of 
the division of powers can reduce the constraints between local 
Tianxin Hu and Jing Zhou 183 
 
governments, increasing social participation, and forming more constraints 
on spatial planning. 
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